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Review of the Constitution of the Republic of Kurdistan · Peer-reviewed essay

Strong and accountable executive power

President, cabinet and public administration under Clauses 10, 12, 22, 104 and 109

Abstract

The Constitution permits energetic executive leadership but rejects personal rule. This article links presidential direction, cabinet solidarity, a merit-based civil service, parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review into one model of effective constitutional government.

Keywords: executive power · presidency · cabinet · civil service · accountability
Research method

Doctrinal analysis of the constitutional text, read together with institutional design, comparative public law and implementation risks. The article distinguishes binding text, interpretive principle and policy recommendation.

Legitimate strength

Executive strength means the lawful capacity to decide, coordinate and deliver—not freedom from limits. Competence, purpose, reasons, time limits and review distinguish authority from arbitrary command.

President and cabinet

The President provides national direction within enumerated powers, while the cabinet converts policy into coordinated administration. Written responsibility prevents each institution from using the other as cover for failure.

Merit-based administration

A professional civil service preserves continuity across elections. Open recruitment, objective promotion, political neutrality and protected reporting are essential to a capable state.

Oversight and consequence

Questions, inquiries, audit, judicial review and publication of performance data should lead to correction or sanction. Oversight without timely information and enforceable consequences becomes ceremonial.

Conclusion

The strongest executive is one whose capacity is legally organised, publicly measured and personally accountable.

References

  1. دەستووری کۆماری کوردستان، بەندەکانی ١٠، ١٢، ٢٢، ١٠٤ و ١٠٩، وەشانی ٢٧٢٦ی کوردی.
  2. M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 2nd ed., Liberty Fund, 1998.
  3. James Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. 51, 1788.
  4. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity, 2017.