The Liberation State and the Constitutional Operationalization of National Will

The central research question of this article is this: how can the Liberation State, under the Constitution of the Republic of Kurdistan, transform the sovereign will of the Kurdish Nation during the liberation stage into law, authority, institution, organized power, representation, and constitutional transfer?

The hypothesis of the article is that the Liberation State is legitimate only when it embodies three elements at once: first, the capacity of power and defence required to protect the Nation; second, legality and institution-building so that power does not become unlimited ownership; and third, an honourable transfer through which the mandate of liberation delivers itself, at the moment of the establishment of the independent Republic, to the elected institutions.

The Liberation State and the Constitutional Operationalization of National Will

The Liberation State, in the Constitution of the Republic of Kurdistan, is not merely the name of a temporary institution. It is the constitutional answer to a major problem of statecraft: when a Nation possesses National Sovereignty, but its land remains under the authority of occupying powers, how can that sovereignty be moved from the level of right and aspiration to the level of law, command, institution, defence, external relations, and the transfer of authority?

Article 122 establishes the Liberation State of Kurdistan as the “formal instrument for the operationalization of the steeled national will.” This phrase is the foundation of the entire argument. The Liberation State is not an end in itself; it is an instrument. Yet it is not a simple administrative instrument. It is the formal instrument by which national will is made operational. It is the place where national will becomes decision, decision becomes system, system becomes institution, and institution becomes the legally ordered power of liberation.

From this perspective, the Liberation State must not be read as the equivalent of a movement, a political party, a spontaneous committee, or a temporary coalition. It is the legal embodiment of a national mandate. The difference between “struggle” and the “Liberation State” lies precisely here: struggle may express will, but the Liberation State transforms that will into organized, limited, and measurable authority.

Power and Law: The Two Pillars of the Liberation State

In the classical theory of the state, a state without the capacity of protection and defence is only a legal name without operative force. Thomas Hobbes reads the state as an artificial body whose central purpose is protection, with sovereignty functioning as the animating principle of that body. [1] This reading is important for the Liberation State because the stage of liberation is not an ordinary stage of government. It is the stage between legitimate sovereignty and the coercive reality of occupation. In such a stage, the protection of the Nation and the movement of struggle toward institutional construction cannot be separated.

Machiavelli also offers a clear principle in a power-centred understanding of statecraft: stable rule depends on the conjunction of legal order and armed capacity. [2] This principle must not be understood as the release of power from law. On the contrary, it means that law without protective force is weak, while force without law becomes dangerous. Article 122 brings both together: the national liberation struggle and modern institution-building.

The mandate of the Liberation State therefore has two faces. The first is the operationalization of national power for liberation. The second is the limitation of that power by the Constitution, record, public service, transparency, and transfer. If the first face is absent, the Liberation State becomes a text without practical capacity. If the second face is absent, it becomes a stage authority that builds unlimited rule in the name of liberation.

The Foundational Duty: Liberation, Nation-Building, and Institution-Building

Article 122 defines the foundational duty of the Liberation State through three principal lines: the conduct of the national liberation struggle, nation-building and modern institution-building, and the preparation of the foundation for the establishment of the independent Republic. These three duties are not merely an administrative list. They form a hierarchy of statecraft.

A liberation struggle without nation-building may remain at the level of opposition to the occupying power, but it cannot build a Republic. Nation-building without institution-building may create consciousness and moral unity, but it cannot produce law, budget, records, security, and representation. Institution-building without preparation for the independent Republic may turn itself into an end, and at that moment the Liberation State changes from an instrument into a self-preserving authority.

In the science of the state, the fate of liberation stages is often measured by whether they can transform the power of struggle into institutional power. Charles Tilly’s analysis of war-making and state-making shows that power becomes state-building only when it is organized through law, protection, resource extraction, and internal order. [3] The Liberation State in the Constitution of Kurdistan resolves the same problem in constitutional language: the end of struggle must not be the authority of struggle; it must be the independent state and its elected institutions.

The Liberation State and National Sovereignty

National Sovereignty during the stage of occupation has two levels. The first is existential and legal legitimacy: the Kurdish Nation possesses its right even if an occupying power, in present reality, controls the land. The second is operational capacity: that sovereignty must be able to produce a legal system, a security system, an external-relations system, and a financial system.

The Liberation State is the connecting ring between these two levels. It cannot create National Sovereignty, because sovereignty originates from the Nation. But it can operationalize that sovereignty by turning it into command, decision, record, representation, and defence. This is the essential distinction between the “bearer of sovereignty” and the “operator of sovereignty.” The bearer of sovereignty is the Nation; the provisional operator of that sovereignty is the Liberation State.

From this distinction, the limits of authority become clear. The Liberation State cannot replace the Nation. It cannot transform the mandate of liberation into permanent ownership. It cannot administer national assets, the forces of defence, the register of citizens, or external relations as the property of an individual, a party, or a group. It is a trustee, not an owner.

The Intelligent State and Infrastructural Capacity

Article 122 connects the Liberation State with the system of the Intelligent State. This connection is important because, in the modern era, statecraft is not measured only by physical control over territory. The capacity to record, identify, communicate, protect information, distribute public service, organize budgets, and conduct external representation is part of the infrastructural power of the state.

Michael Mann’s distinction between coercive power and infrastructural power shows that the real capacity of the state often lies in its ability to extend organization, information, and coordination into the interior of society in a centralized and territorial manner. [4] For the Liberation State, this means that power is not only the power of defence. Power is also the capacity of record, communication, archive, identity, data protection, and public service.

Yet the Intelligent State carries its own risks. A digital system, if not limited by law, transparency, and accountability, can turn from an instrument of liberation into an instrument of unlimited surveillance. Therefore, from the standpoint of constitutional interpretation, the Intelligent State must observe five conditions: protection of personal information, cybersecurity, transparent reporting, financial audit, and the legal limitation of authority. Where these points are not stated under these exact names, they should be read as institutional proposals derived from the spirit of Article 122 and its relation to Article 126, not as direct constitutional text.

Order, Security, and Institution-Building

The Liberation State operates in a stage where the occupying authority has created a coercive reality. In this condition, the Liberation State cannot operate only through the language of demand. It must possess the capacity of organization, protection, command, external relations, and the unification of national power. Yet every power-centred decision must have a constitutional limit, because the force of liberation, once outside the limit of the Constitution, can turn from national force into group force.

From this point, a foundational measure emerges: the Liberation State needs a unified centre of command, but that centre must not stand outside the law. It needs forces of defence, but those forces must not become the property of a party or an individual. It needs budget and resources, but national assets must not remain outside audit and transparency. It needs external relations, but those relations must not become agreements for the self-preservation of those who temporarily hold authority.

Samuel P. Huntington’s analysis of order and institutions shows that the central political problem is often not the absence of change, but the absence of capable institutions able to organize change. [5] This point is crucial for the Liberation State. Liberation, if not absorbed into institutions, may create a vacuum of authority after its own success. The Liberation State must therefore build power, order, law, and transfer at the same time.

Historical Case: Free France and the Provisional Authority of the Republic

The case of Free France and its subsequent institutions is an important example of how a liberation institution can operate against occupation and an imposed system, and how national power can be transformed into an institutional transfer. This case is not identical to the Constitution of Kurdistan and must not be mechanically imposed upon Kurdistan. Yet as a historical case, it provides several lessons of statecraft.

First, the context. After the occupation of a major part of France in 1940, the central problem became this: who could speak in the name of France, who could organize the liberation struggle, and how could republican legitimacy be preserved against an imposed authority? The practical answer to this problem emerged through Free France, then the French Committee of National Liberation, and later the Provisional Government of the French Republic. [6]

Second, the source of legitimacy. The French Committee of National Liberation did not derive its legitimacy from the occupying power. Its legitimacy came from the claim of republican continuity, the organization of struggle, external relations, and the capacity for institution-building. The Assemblée nationale records that the French Committee of National Liberation received formal recognition in August 1943 from the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, and by the end of that year it had been recognized by thirty-seven states. [7] This shows that when a liberation institution stands on legitimacy, organization, and effectiveness, it can emerge externally as a centre of national representation.

Third, command structure and transfer. The French Committee of National Liberation was not merely a body of proclamation. It prepared the restoration of republican authority and the organization of civil and military authority in liberated territory. On March 14, 1944, formal measures were issued so that, upon liberation, authorities appointed under the imposed system would be replaced by representatives of the Committee. [8] This demonstrates methodically that a Liberation State needs a prior plan for transfer; transfer must not be improvised after victory.

Fourth, legal restoration. France issued the ordinance of August 9, 1944 concerning the restoration of republican legality on the continental territory. Within that framework, the fundamental principle was that the form of government of France was and remained the Republic, and that, in law, the Republic had not ceased to exist. [9] This point is theoretically important because it distinguishes between the practical control of the occupying power and the legal legitimacy of the Nation. The occupier may control territory, but that control does not itself become the source of national legitimacy.

Fifth, recognition and internal transfer. On October 23, 1944, the United States recognized the French de facto authority under General de Gaulle as the Provisional Government of the French Republic, while emphasizing that the French themselves should undertake the civil administration of their country and that the provisional authority should operate until the will of the Nation could be expressed through elected representatives. [10] This is also a clear lesson for the Liberation State of Kurdistan: external recognition is important, but it is not a substitute for internal legitimacy and electoral transfer.

The methodological conclusion of this case is the following: if a liberation institution is to become stable statecraft, it must possess five capacities: a national source of legitimacy, unified command, external-relations capacity, a plan for internal transfer, and a legal-restoration mechanism. This corresponds to the structure of Articles 122 to 126, because these Articles move the Liberation State from mere struggle to institution-building and the transfer of authority.

Measures for Examining the Liberation State

From the constitutional text and the theoretical interpretation together, five measures can be identified for examining the conduct of the Liberation State.

First, the measure of purpose: every act of the Liberation State must serve national liberation, nation-building, institution-building, and the preparation of the foundation of the independent Republic. An act that only prolongs the survival of those who hold authority does not conform to the mandate of Article 122.

Second, the measure of power: the Liberation State must possess the capacity of protection, command, and National Defence. Yet this power must be legal, unified, and bound by constitutional oath. The forces of defence must not become the property of a party, group, family, or individual.

Third, the measure of law: the Liberation State must organize every decision, record, budget, relation, and institution within the framework of the Constitution. The stage of struggle must not become a title for releasing authority from the Rule of Law.

Fourth, the measure of infrastructure: the Liberation State must build the capacity for records, information protection, digital diplomacy, national archive, digital identity, and initial public service. Yet this infrastructure must be limited by rights, cybersecurity, and accountability.

Fifth, the measure of transfer: the Liberation State must always prepare itself to hand over authority. Article 126 identifies this point clearly: the historical duty of the Liberation State is to bring Kurdistan to the first founding act of the independent state; after authority is secured over a strategic part of the National Territory and security is guaranteed, the first general founding election must be organized within a period that does not exceed eighteen months.

Conclusion

The Liberation State in the Constitution of the Republic of Kurdistan is a legal and power-centred answer to an exceptional historical condition. That condition is this: the Kurdish Nation possesses National Sovereignty, while occupying powers exist coercively on the land of Kurdistan. The Constitution resolves this contradiction by establishing the Liberation State as the formal instrument for operationalizing the steeled national will.

The core of the argument is that the Liberation State is not merely responsible for struggle and not merely responsible for administration. It is responsible for the movement of the Nation from the condition of occupation to the condition of an independent state. This movement cannot be accomplished by power without law, nor by law without power. Law and power must meet inside an institutional structure that knows its own limits, derives its legitimacy from the Nation and the Constitution, and proves the end of its mandate by handing authority to elected institutions.

The best definition of the Liberation State is therefore this: the Liberation State is the provisional, legal, and power-centred embodiment of national will, whose duty is to transform struggle into institution, sovereignty into operation, and national victory into an independent Republic. If this state has power without law, it creates the danger of unlimited rule. If it has law without power, it cannot protect the Nation. If it has both without transfer, the mandate of liberation becomes stage ownership. Only when power, law, and transfer operate together does the Liberation State become the true bridge between national struggle and the independent Republic.